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EAR the end of 1973 the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC) increased the
average price of crude oil to about $10 per barrel,
more than four times the prevailing price earlier that
year.1 This price was increased another 10 percent in
1975, nearly 15 percent from 1975 to early 1979, and
about doubled from early 1979 to early 1980. By De-
cember 1980, the price of United States imported oil
averaged $35.63 per barrel, more than 12 times the
price in mid-1973. These sharp increases have ad-
versely affected the U.S. economy by reducing both
potential output and productivity, raising the general
price level and slowing real business investment.2
OPEC’s actions in raising oil prices and restricting
production have given rise to numerous proposals
designed to offset the higher petroleum costs. One
widely discussed proposal has been for the United
Statesto organize a graincartel that would significantly
raise grain prices to the OPEC nations. Many sug-
gest that the terms of trade between the two cartels
should be a bushel of wheat for a barrel of oil, i.e.,
about the same terms that prevailed in early 1973
when wheat sold for about $2 per bushel and im-
ported oil sold for about $2 per barrel.
This article assesses the potential success of such a
grain cartel, It describes the attributes of a cartel and
shows why a grain cat-tel could not succeed. It argues
t
The OPEC nations ‘vere originally composed of Saudi Arabia,
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Venezuela; Qatar, Indonesia, Libya,
Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, Cabon and the United Arab Emi-
rates later became members. OPEC: Questions and Answers
(New York: Exxon Corporation), pp. 7, 12; Middle East Oil,
2nd ed. (New York: Exxon Corporation, 1980), pp. 34-36;
U.S. Department of Energy, Monthly Energy Review (De-
cember 1980), p. 72.
2
See John A. Tatom, “Energy Prices and Short-Run Economic
Performance, this Review (January 1981), pp. 3-17.
that OPEC’s success in influencing petroleum prices
results from certain economic conditions in the mar-
ket for oil that do not exist in the market for grain.3
Competitive Firms Versus Cartels:
Prices and Output
The impact of a cartel (a combination of firms,
states, or groups whose purpose is to restrict output
and increase profits) can best be described by con-
trasting its profit-maximizing operations with those of
firms in a competitive industry. Every cartel or competi-
tive firm produces at the rate of output that maxi-
mizes its profits. However, given market demands and
cost structures, the rate of output consistent with profit
maximization will differ between firms organized into
a cartel and those in a competitive industry. These
different rates of output imply different prices. In
a competitive industry, output and price levels are
determined by the intersection of the industry demand
and supply curves. The demand curve indicates the
varying amounts of a commodity that buyers will
purchase at each price, while the supply curve indi-
cates the varying amounts of a commodity that sellers
will supply at each price. At the point where these
curves intersect, competitive producers will supply the
quantity of a good that consumers wish to purchase
at that price; any firm that attempts to raise its price
by producing less will simply lose sales to other finns
in the industry.
If the firms form a cartel, however, they can influ-
ence market price in their favor by restricting output.
tm
The OPEC cartel may not meet the strict definition of a cartel
in all respects, but this term is used to facilitate discussion.
An alternative analysis, not pursued here, would treat OPEC
as the dominant finn that sets and lets the small producers
sell all they wantat that price.
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The profit-maximizing rate of output will thus be less
and the price higher than would prevail in a com-
petitive industry.
Cartels Are Typically Unstable
A cartel, however, is unlikely to survive imless its
rules are enforced by government sanction. Histor-
ically, cartels have been fragile, lasting only a short
time. Unless all producers in the industry are members
of the cartel, the higher price of the good caused by
the cartel’s restriction of output provides a great in-
centive for nonmembers to increase their own output.4
Moreover, firms have a powerful incentive not to join
the cartel. The higher price resulting from the restric-
tions on output by the cartel will increase nonmem-
bers’ profits even more since they can expand their
rates of output. Consequently, each potential member
of the cartel faces essentially the same incentive not
to join, and actual cartel members will find their
share of the market and profits reduced as nonmem-
bers increase their production and sales.
The length of time that a cartel can survive depends
in part on the elasticity of the supply curve of the
industry’s output. The less elastic the supply curve,
the longer the cartel is likely to survive. If a large
increase in price elicits only a small increase in out-
put by non-cartel firms, there will be less pressure
on the cartel.
Likewise, the more inelastic the demand curve for
the cartel’s product, the higher the price can be raised
without drastically reducing the quantity demanded
and the greater the potential cartel profit. If good
substitutes are available for the cartel’s product, how-
ever, this will not occur; sizable increases in the price
of the cartel’s product will result in larger purchases
of these substitute goods. In this case, the cartel is
unlikely to increase its profits for long by restricting
•output and raising prices.
Although both the demand and supply relation-
ships may appear to be quite inelastic in the short
run, demand and supply conditions will change over
time in response to higher prices. These changes will
reduce the stability of the cartel. First, over time,
substitutes will always be found for the cartel’s prod-
uct. As the price of petroleum rises, people learn how
to substitute other goods (e.g., coal, alcohol, nuclear
energy, etc.) as sources of energy. Furthermore,
4
See Ceorge J. Stigler, The Theory of Price, 3rd ed. (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1966), pp. 230-38; and Jack I-lush-
leifer, Price Theory and Applications (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1980), p. 362.
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greater economies in the use of a good, which also
reduce the quantity of the good demanded, can be
achieved over the long run. For example, the in-
creased use of smaller automobiles and insulation
have reduced the quantity of petroleum demanded
for gasoline and heating. Consequently, the quantity
demanded decreases more drastically over time.
Second, new techniques of production, new dis-
coveries and new investments will increase the quan-
tity of the cartel’s product (e.g., petroleum) supplied
by others.
if the cartel is initially successful in raising prices
sufficiently to increase profits, rivalry will arise be-
tween the cartel members over how the reduced out-
put and the increased profits are to be allocated. Each
member will want to sell more as the price is in-
creased through general production restrictions — that
is, each member has an incentive to cheat on the car-
tels sales quotas. Intense rivalry for greater market
shares will develop among cartel members. Therefore,
it becomes increasingly difficult for cartels to exist for
extended periods.
OPEC Not Immune from Pressures
The OPEC cartel has not been immune to these
pressures. It is presently in the throes of relatively
severe adjustments in output in response to market
forces. It has already lost much of its international
market to non-OPEC suppliers as shown in table 1.
OPEC countries produced an increasing portion of
the world’s petroleum output until 1973, at which
time they accounted for 55.5 percent of the total, up
from 52.6 percent in 1972, 48.3 percent in 1970 and
37.6 percent in 1960. Their annual rate of pro-
duction rose in excess of 8 percent per year through
1974, well above that of non-OPEC countries. Follow-
ing the first major price increase in late 1973, total
OPEC output dropped somewhat for two years and
then rose moderately through 1977. Then, from 1977 to
1979 its output declined somewhat. Since late 1979,
following the latest round of major price increases,
OPEC’s output has declined rapidly, dropping about
22 percent in the latest 12 months. Its share of the
market, which totaled 55.5 percent in 1973, declined
slowly to 49.6 percent in 1979. The decline has re-
cently accelerated: OPEC’s market share dropped to
44 percent by September 1980.
Higher oil prices have induced the non-OPEC world
to increase output. Output in non-OPEC nations rose
from 24.9 million barrels per day in 1977 to 32M mil-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS APRIL 1981
Table I
!orld Crude CII Production (thousand barrels per day)
Growth Rest of Growth OPEC
OPEC Rate’ World Rate’ Share
1960 7,874~ 13,087 376%
1961 8,497 13,923 37.9
1982 9,954 10.8% 14,383 5.5% 40.9
1963 10,865 16,253 41,8
1964 12,082 16,081 42.9
1965 13,177 17,115 43.8
1986 14,217 18,693 43.2
1967 15,630 109 19.732 6.7 442
1988 17,660 20,983 45.7
1989 20,341 21,341 48.8
1970 22,134.~ 23,692 48.3
1971 25,092 23,255 51.9
1972 26,711 ~- 85 24,070 1.5 52.6
1973 30,961 J 24,869 55.5
1974 30,683) 25,192 54 9
1975 27,134 ~ 0.6 25,858 41 51.2
1976 30,711 j 26,684 53.5
1977 31,230) 28380 52.4
isis 29,800 F —0.5 30,390 5 3 49.5
1979 30,928 31,472) 49,6
19802 26,743,)- 13.5 32,5581 3.5 45.1
November 1979 30,770 32,370) 48 ~
—21.8 F —o,i
November1980 24,015 3Z335~ 42.6
‘Annual rates of change 2Estimated for November and December
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy, ~iontJily Energy Review. (March 1981), American
Petroleum Institute, Basic Petroleum Data Book (June 1977)
lion barrels per day in mid-1980 and has apparently OPEC’s cutback on production to maintain the car-
maintained its pre-1973 rate of growth despite some tel price clearly’ caused stress among the colluding
decline in late 1980 in Mexico, and earlier declines nations. Though the reduction in output is absorbed
in the United States and Canada where, until recently, by the group each nation’s share in the reduction will
price controls have reduced the incentive for oil differ. Per capita revenues also differ among individual
production.~ nations. For example, oil revenue per capita varied
from $480 in Iran to $17,300 in the United Arab
~The profits accruing to OPFC were enhanced and extended Emirates in 1979.6 Such differences engender conflicts
over a longer period of time than they might othe,wi e hn~-e
been by ill ad ised U.S. policu s. In ~ittempting to cushion the .-
impact of the sharply higher OPEC prices on the domestic sumption to the higher oil price reduced the incentive for
conomy, the U.S. government has uhjected the oil industry dome tic production and led to great r rehanc on imports,
to varying degrees of price controls the last of hich were thereby enhancing OPEC’s ability to influence prices For a
lifted only thi year. The industry was then sñbject dt oan further discus ion of this topic, see Hans H. Helbling and
excess” profits tax which will contnue to retard its inc n- lames E. Turley ‘Oil Price Controls: A Counterproductive
tive to explore and develop petroleum. Effort,” this Review (November 1975) pp. 2-6.
These controls delayed the adjustment of domestic con- OMiddle East Oil p. 39.
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about how additional reductions are to be shared. In
addition, non-OPEC, producer/exporters like Mexico
and Norway can obtain the existing high world price
without resorting to output reduction. The OPEC car-
tel will face future problems in maintaining profit as
the United States and other nations eliminate price
and marketing controls in the oil industry.
WHY OPEC HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL
FOR SO LONG
OPEC’s actions have led to a rapid rise in petroleum
prices and revenues for all oil producers, both OPEC
and non-OPEC. From 1973 to 1979, receipts from
petroleum sales by Middle East governments rose
about tenfold.7 Hence, OPEC has clearly succeeded
in achieving its main objective.
An analysis of the supply of and demand for petro-
leum in the non-OPEC nations shows why OPEC has
been so successful. First, there has been only a small
increase in petroleum output by non-OPEC members
following the sharply higher pricesin 1973, indicating
that supply of petroleum in non-OPEC nations is
relatively price inelastic. Although, the price of petro-
leum has increased about twelvefold during this pe-
riod, petroleum output in non-OPEC nations has in-
creased only 24 percent.8 It is estimated that the long-
run price elasticity of the non-OPEC oil supply is
between .33 and .67. In other words, a 1 percent in-
crease in price of oil will cause output to increase
about .5 percent?
Part of the reason for the short-run inelastic supply
of petroleum by non-OPEC nations is the dominant
position of OPEC in the petroleum industry. From
1945 to 1979, about three-fourths of world oil dis-
coveries were in the Middle East (largely the OPEC
area) .~° In 1973, when OPEC began restricting pro-
duction, it was producing about 31 million barrels of
~Ibid,p. 31.
°Monthly Energy Review (December 1980), pp. 88-89 and
Middle Fest Oil, p. 26. Part of the apparent inelasticity, how-
ever, reflects the impact of the price controls in the United
States and Canada.
°MichaelKermedy, “A World Oil Model,” in Dale W. Jorgen-
son, ed., Econometric Studies of U.S. Energy Policy, (Amster-
dam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1976), p. 139. On
the demand side, the long-mn price elasticity of demand for
gasoline in the United States has been estimated at about —.8,
which indicates that an increase in price of 1 percent causes
a reduction of about .8 of a percent in quantity demanded,
p. 132.
‘0Middle East Oil, p. 37.
oil per day, more than four-fifths of which was ex-
ported. OPEC supplied 83.4 percent of all petroleum
exports in 1978 (table 2).
Also, petroleum demand by non-OPEC nations
is clearly price inelastic, at least in the short run. The
large increase in price has resulted in a relatively
small decrease in quantity demanded as confirmed
by petroleum consumption in the major free-world
industrialized countries from 1973 until mid-1980. Al-
though petroleum prices have risen about twelvefold,
consumption in these nations has declined only 10
percent, from 34.2 to 31.1 million barrels per day.1’
Not surprisingly, most of the more developed na-
tions are highly dependent on imports for their supply
of petroleum. Western Europe, for example, produced
only 12 to 14 percent of its domestic consumption.
South Mrica and Japan imported essentially all of
their petroleum (table 3). Even the United States,
one of the world’s largest petroleum-producing na-
tions, imported more than 50 percent of its petroleum.
Furthermore, most of the less-developed, non-OPEC
nations depend largely on imports for petroleum sup-
plies. Thirty-seven of these nations produced an aver-
age of only 12 percent of their consumption. Among
the non-OPEC nations, only Egypt, Syria and Mexico
have sizable quantities of petroleum exports, and the
combined exports of these countries totaled less than
10 percent of U.S. imports in 1978. Given OPEC’s
predominant position and the length of time required
for the exploration and development of petroleum
resources or substitutes for petroleum, the slow re-
sponse of output by the non-OPEC world to the
higher price of oil is to be expected. Hence, OPEC’s
ability to increase profits by restricting output is not
surprising.
WHY A U.S. GRAIN CARTEL
WOULD FAIL
The U.S. grain industry does not possess the attri-
butes necessary for a strong cartel. Both the world
demand for and supply of U.S. grain are relatively
elastic. On the demand side, the price elasticity of
foreign demand for U.S. output of food and feed has
been estimated to be —1.9 in the intermediate run
~iMonthly Energy Review (December 1980), p. 90. These data
overstate the inelasticity of petroleum demand at any one
point in time since demand has been increasing (the demand
curve was shifting to the right) - Another factor contributing
to the relatively high rate of oil consumption has been the
price controls which assured gasoline to U.S. and Canadian
consumers at less than world prices.
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Table 2
Crude Oil Production and Exports, Selected Countries
(millions of barrels)
Percent of Percent
World Net of World
OPEC Members Production Production Exports Exports
Algeria 401.5 1.8% 366.0 3.2%
Ecuador 74.8 0.3 44.8 0.4
Gabon 917.9 4.2 870.3 0.6
Indonesia 596.8 2.7 503.4 4.4
Iran 1,898.0 8.7 1,645.4 14.3
Iraq 918.0 4.2 870.3 7.6
Kuwait 764.7 3.5 642.8 5.6
Libya 720.9 3.3 677.0 5.9
Nigeria 697.2 3.2 677.0 5.9
Qatar 176.5 0.8 175.2 1.5
Saudi Arabia 3,027.7 13.8 2,612.7 24.5
United Arab Emirates 667.9 3.1 663.1 5.8
Venezuela 790.2 3.6 453.4 3.9
TOTAL OPEC 10,810.7 49.4 9,595.1 83.4
Other Major Producing Nations’
Argentina 165.2 0.8% 14.9 0.1%
Australia 157.0 0.7 69.7 —
Canada 480.0 2.2 —127.5 —
Egypt 169.5 0.8 47.8 0.4
Mexico 443.5 2.0 133.2 1.2
Norway 127.2 0.6 71.8 0.6
Oman 115.0 0.5 115.0 1.0
United Kingdom 394.2 1.8 —315.1 —
United States 3,178.1 14.5 —2,278.1 —
Sino-SovietArea 4,978.0 22.8 130.0 1.1
TOTAL 10,207.7 46.7 —2,277.7 —
WORLD TOTAL 21,874.5 11,501.82
Those producing 100 inillic n l.i rrvis i mor p ‘1 3 ear
2 j citil exports
souRc:E: t ‘‘S. De~arlmenLif mne-gy. lntc,nau nai Petrol urn Annual 1978
thn e to Jour year ) and —0.-I in the longer rim. Thuc. b tsis of real prü CS. PC Ursoi i found ih,tt 1 perc ‘‘?il
a pnet’ hi1~c of J. creelii u C rId resu Ii in a ck’erc,isc- incrc-ase in Ga- rc d p1 Ic’ ‘ oil, rni prodia t lead LI’ in
F I .9 percent in quantity dciiiandc’d in three to f icr iuerea.e I about 1.5 1~ ~ ‘it iii Iota] \~ or!! uiLpia.i
C Lrs wd a (,. t penc it di ‘.rc a’c in the ]ole4er iiin. Similar rc suits hasc been observed in the Unif.,l
Stift’s. lor cx imple. one study lound that ~o _~ih
The supply ol grain is also rclahvclv elastic. On the
::jf Dud /,‘r I ,~ ~j 5~u, ,p,, n pt , I +r,,’n I \\‘ll-. . P I ‘ii. item hun,] I ri’ l’’ic’ ‘ ‘,. . ‘ia!
/.‘ ul Thu’. ci, hi /,/n’- Inc/i. ~t ‘L,d. diir’’r’,i . (‘‘‘lii (lii ~ Fcu I, !a,’’ .S’n’ i,.’, (ui-i. .1 il-
Liiivc-rsity. 967 pp. 360, ,t~. (oral I ow (lt’.rair~ !‘7’i’. pp fl—iFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS APRIL 1981
Table 3
Self-Sufficiency in Grain and Petroleum Consumption (1978’)
Grain Consumption Petroleum Consumption
Million Production Production
Number of Metric as Percent of Number of Million as Percent of
Region Countries Tons Consumption Countries Barrels Consumption
More-Developed Areas
United States 1 178.4 152% 1 6.579 46%
Canada 1 22.6 183 1 634 76
European Community2 9 119.3 95 9 4,010 12
OtherWestern Europe’ 5 43.7 84 8 1,018 14
South Africa 1 9.2 110 1 107 0
Japan i ~ 35 1 1,877 0
Oceania4 2 6.7 394 2 257 63
Centrally Planned Countries’ 10 564.2 97 10 4,376 100
OPEC Nations 13 59.4 73 13 817 1,323
Other Less-Developed Nations
With Grain Production of:
90,- percent of consumption 30 233.4 108 11 818 136
80-89 percent of consumption 13 70.7 73 1 57 83
70-79 percent of consumption 6 11.2 76 0 ——
60-69 percent of consumption 7 8.1 64 0 ——
0-59 percent ofconsumption 21 36.1 51 37 1,395 12
I Petrok-um data for calendar year, nd grain data ( wheat, cnar~c-grain., amt ii i]]cd rat’ I for oi.irketi,g car I 97’S—79.
~BcIgium. Denmark, Franc-c-, West Cc’rmariv, lr,-la,al, I talj,-. l.uxc’iiiburrr, N.’ethc-rlands, Un ted Kirigdcnn
3
Austria. Finland, Greece, Norway, Portugal. Spain, Sweden. Switzerland
1
Australia, Nnv Zealand
~AIliani’a. Bnlçaria. Czechoslovakia, East Cc-rummy, Hangar>, Poland. Rumaui-i. YugosIa~ ii USSR China
Sot - LIrE I ~5. Departnieri ,,f /s ~, jculwrc’, c;l&~~d Food Asst’ ssua’nt, 1980, am] t~.S. Departmuc’nt of Em-,gv. International
Pcjrolcu,r, Annual 1978.
1 percent increase in price, crop output would rise used since 1933 to raise farm prices and increase re-
about 1.5 percent in the long run.14
turns to U.S. farmers for a number of major exported
crops, such as wheat, cotton, tobacco and rice. These Given the elastic erriort demand for and an elastic
-. . programs were successful in increasing farm profits
world supply of gram in the long run, the effective- for a few years. The higher price of these commodities
ness of a U.S-enforced gram cartel in increasing urofits -
increased profits to the U.S farm producers and for- to U.S. farmers or to the nation for more than a year
eign producers, and food prices to U.S. and foreign or two is unhkely. In the longer run of four to five
consumers. However, these farm production control
years, such a cartel would be disastrous. and price support programs have been considered
failures by many people over the long run.
15
Similar Policies Have Failed in the Past,
The United States has had some experience with The United States accounted for 62 percent of world
cartel-type policies in the farm sector. Production cotton exports and its share of world cotton produc-
restrictions and commodity loan programs have been
15
See, for example, George Leland Bach, Economics: An Intro-
iiLuther C, Tweeten, Foundations of Farm Policy (Lincoln: duction to Analysis and Policy, 8th ed. (Englewood Cliffs,
University of Nebraska Press, 1970), p. 244. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), pp. 292~3O3.
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hon had risen slightly during the 10 years prior to the
adoption of these programs for cotton in 1933 (table
4). Following the adoption of the cotton program, the
United States became the residual supplier of cotton
(as OPEC has become the residual supplier of oil) -
Other cotton-exporting nations such as Mexico, Peru
and Egypt sold all of their cotton output at the higher
world prices, while the United States exported the
remainder of world imports. The higher world cotton
price predictably induced other nations to increase
cotton production and induced consumers to increase
their use of cotton substitutes such as rayon and other
synthetic fibers.
The higher price likewise induced U.S. growers to
increase domestic cotton production. Production con-
trols were necessary to limit output to domestic con-
sumption and export levels at the fixed prices. As a
result of this program, the U.S. share of world cotton
production declined steadily, dropping from 56 per-
cent in 1930-32 to 42 percent in 1940-42, 36 percent
in 1950-52, 31 percent in 1960-62 and 20 percent in
1970-72. Exports declined from 8.4 million bales in
1930-32 (62 percent of world exports) to 4.4 million
bales in 1952 (36 percent of world exports).‘~
The International Wheat Agreement, initiated in
1949 and renewed at intervals until 1965, resulted in
an organization that included both net-exporting and
net-importing nations.’7 The stated purpose of the
agreement was to stabilize the price and quantity of
wheat in international trade. Originally, each exporter
was to furnish a specific quantity of wheat for export
and each importer to purchase a specific quantity. The
organization soon evolved into a cartel with theUnited
States and Canada as the price leaders. The United
States supplied the residual wheat demanded at the
specified price. The cartel broke down in 1964, when
the United States decided to regain the Japanese mar-
ket captured earlier by the Canadians. Although U.S.
production controls and price supports to farmers were
maintained, the breakdown of the cartel and a reduc-
lion of U.S. wheat prices were quickly followed by
accelerating U.S. wheat exports. U.S. wheat exports
through commercial channels had averaged 141.2 mil-
lion bushels per year during 1955-59, 12 percent of
total world wheat exports. By 1964, when the cartel
was dismantled, such exports totaled 157.7 million
‘°U.S,Department of Agriculture, Statistics on Cotton and Re-
lated Data 1920-1973 (GPO, 1974), pp. 40 and 49-50.
17
5ee Alex MeCaila, “A Duopoly Model of Wheat Pricing,”
Journal of Farm Economics (August 1966), p.71’. The U.S.
wheat surplus that could not be sold at the established price
was transferred to the less-developed nations through major
government subsidy programs.
Table 4
World Production of Cotton




States Countries tion Exports
1920-22 10,376 8,497 55.0% 57.1%
1930-32 14,677 11,439 56.2 62.3
1940-42 12,042 16.776 41.8 23.6
1950-52 13,434 23.441 36.4 36.0
1980-62 14,449 31.860 31.2 31.6
1970-72 11,378 44,967 20.2 22.3
SolIICL: 15.5. l)t’p;utmmn’nt of Amzncimlt mr,. ~Jahi.stic on
C,ilti,,, a,,il H,‘fated Data 1020— I .973. C )cWhir
974. W a,hin~tnn. D.C.
bushels, only 9 percent of world wheat exports. By
1970, such exports had risen to 508.0 million bushels
or 26 percent of world wheat exports.’8
A grain cartel composed of a number of the major
grain-producing nations might increase profits from
grain exports for a somewhat longer period than the
U.S. could acting alone. However, within a few years,
demand for the cartel-produced grain would become
more elastic, profit from grain sales by the cartel
would decline sharply and the problem of allocating
production among the nations would become more
intense.
-.the Potential for Punishing
OPEC Nations Is Limited.,.
A U.S-sponsored grain cartel will not succeed in
punishing OPEC because there is a relatively small
demand for grain imports in most OPEC nations. In-
comes in some OPEC nations are sufficient to pur-
chase large quantities of grain. Most OPEC members,
however, have relatively small populations and/or
small per capita incomes and, hence, relatively
small demand for grain; those with large populations
such as Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq and Nigeria
have relatively small incomes per capita, and grain
demand is relatively small because of low income
(table 5). In contrast, Saudi Arabia with a population
iSU.5, Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics, (GPO,
1966 and 1972).
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Table 5




Algeria 16,145~000 $ 780
Ecuador 7783000 741





Libya 2 920,000 6,335
Nigeria 74 595,000 682
Qatar 210,000 12,500
Saudi Arabia 9,292,000 6,089
United Arab mmrates 871,000 11 000
Venezuela 14,529~00 2,772
Other Nations




United Kingdom 55,901 000 4955
United States 222,020 000 8 612
West Germany 81,302,000 9 278
‘Data are 1980 tim tes for the Unit d State and 1979
e timat for all others.
Years for which est, ates wer made vary from 974 for
Qatar to 1978 for nine n t,ons.
SOURCE’ The Wo Id Almanac and Book of Facts 1981
of 9.3 million and an income per capita of $6,089
has both a relatively large population and high in-
come per capita; \ enezuela with a 14.5 m’llion
opulation is likewise not far b hind Western
European ations with per capita inco e of $2 772.
ommercial demand fo~‘mported grain by th
group is a relatively small portion of the wo Id total.
n 1978, the 0 EC nations consumed o y 59 milli
et ic tons of grain less than one-thiS of .8. co -
s mp ion, and they p oduced almost three-fou hs of
air consumptio domestically, imporf go ny a out
6 illio metnc tons. A this 1ev 1 of imports t e
ap oxi ate grain price t at a a el ould aeto
rg ~n r ~t ffsetth ealthtancf rsa hie ed
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by OPEC would be astronomical. U.S. petroleum fin-
ports from the OPEC nations totaled about 1.6 billion
barrels lii 1980, which cost about $34 per barrel and
totaled about $54.4 billion. In 1973, prior to the car-
tel, imports from OPEC totaled about 1.1 billion bar-
rels, which at $2 per barrel totaled $2.2 billion. Ex-
cluding the impact of inflation, the cartel gained $52.2
billion in revenue from its petroleum sales to the
United States alone.
In early 1973; a bushel of wheat and a barrel of
petroleum were selling for about the same price ($2);
hence, if a food cartel attempted to maintain this
relationship, it would require a wheat price from the
OPEC nations of about $34 per bushel or about eight
times the January 1981 average of $4.21. The 16 mil-
lion metric tons of grain imports (588 million bushels)
by OPEC (assuming it was all wheat and all supplied
by the United States) totaled only $1.2 billion inreve-
nue at the $2 per bushel price. Even at $34 per bushel
and with no change in bushels purchased, revenues
would total only $20.0 billion. Thus, the gains from
the grain cartel ($20.0 billion — $1.2 billion) of $18.8
billion would still be less than two-fifths of the OPEC
revenue gains of $52.2 billion ($54.4 billion — $2.2
billion). To offset this level of OPEC gains would
require a wheat price in excess of $100 per bushel.
Furthermore, if the objective of the grain cartel is
to offset total OPEC gains, it would require an even
higher wheat price. Assuming that 83.4 percent of 1980
OPEC petroleum production was exported (the same
percent as in 1978), exports would have totaled 8.24
billion barrels. At $34 per barrel this equals $280.2
billion in revenue compared with 9.42 billion barrels
at $2 per barrel or $18.8 billion in 1973. This differ-
ence in OPEC’s revenue of $261.4 billion would re-
quire a wheat price to OPEC of $445 per bushel.’°
-,.And a U~S.Grain Cartel Would
Cause Famine in Sonic Nations
One factor generally ignored in a discussion of an
anti-OPEC grain cartel is its impact on the well-being
of the non-OPEC world, especially the less-developed
areas. As this nation has recently discovered with its
Russian grain embargo, it would be futile to attempt
to sell grain only to the OPEC nations at cartel prices.
If a U.S.-sponsored grain cartel sold grain at lower
prices to non-OPEC areas, the OPEC group would
buy the grain from these other nations at a lower
iiMiddle East Oil, p. 26; U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S.
Wheat Industry, Agricultural Economic Report No. 432
(August 1979), pp. 51-52; and Monthly Energy Review.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
price while reducing their purchases from the grain
cartel.
There are only two ways to deal with this problem.
One way is to have a grain cartel consisting of all
non-OPEC nations of the world. But just as with the
oil cartel, every nation, especially the less-developed
ones heavily affected by OPEC price increases, would
have a tremendous incentive to remain outside the
cartel. They could then sell the OPEC nations all
their wheat at a price slightly below the carters price.
The other possibility of a successful grain cartel, even
in the short run, is for a few nations to somehow
limit total world exports. This policy would cause
starvation and famine in many non-OPEC nations.
Although OPEC has largely ignored its impact on the
well-being of non-OPEC nations, this is not an accept-
able political possibility for the United States.
SUMMARY
Forming a grain cartel to retaliate against OPEC’s
oil cartel would be ineffective. The OPEC cartel has
been successful because of special supply and demand
conditions for petroleum, which assured an increase
in profits to cartel members when production was
restricted.
A grain cartel composed of the United States alone
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or the United States and a few other leading food-
exporting nations would not succeed. Although it
might raise world grain prices and increase profits to
the cartel members for a year or two, the higher
prices would soon lead to increased production in the
rest of the world and sharp reductions in the quantity
of grain exported by the cartel members. Hence, reve-
nue to the cartel would soon decline to less than pre-
cartel levels.
Moreover, the United States and other nations have
had unfavorable experience with cartel-type farm ex-
port programs. Attempts to maintain cotton prices at
artificially high levels after 1932 resulted in reduced
exports as the United States became the residual sup-
plier, while other producing nations profited from our
production control and price support programs. Simi-
larly, the International Wheat Agreement collapsed
under increased competition by member nations.
Another factor limiting the ability of a food cartel
to punish OPEC is that a food cartel cannot be effec-
tive without doing great injury to people in less-devel-
oped nations. Attempts to provide less-developed,
non-OPEC nations with food on more favorable terms
than the rest of the world would result in reshipment
to OPEC members, thereby nullifying the objectives
of the cartel. A food cartel would, thus, reduce food
supplies for the near destitute masses of people in the
less-developed nations.
21